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HE Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is an agreement promoting free
trade between the United States and six Central American coun-
tries.' Within the body of this agreement, the signatory parties linked the
capability to trade with international labor rights, providing procedures in
the event that one of the parties fails to meet its obligations under the
labor provisions. 2 This concept of linking trade with labor standards in
free trade agreements developed in United States' negotiations within the
last decade; however, as this paper will show, the labor rights provisions
in free trade agreements, specifically CAFTA-DR, fall tragically short of
international standards and fail to produce any meaningful changes or
consequences. 3
Trade itself has existed since the prehistoric era, and is typically
thought of as the exchange of goods, services, or both by sale, gift, or
barter.4 Trade between distant lands is the basis upon which kingdoms
and nations were built, creating civilizations of great wealth and power
throughout history.5 The concept of free trade, the flow of goods and
services without restrictions between countries, was promoted as early as
the seventeenth century with Holland at the center of free trade.6 The
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1. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The "Helping Hand" in Trade Agreements: An Analysis
of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 845, 889 (2004) (discussing CAFTA).
2. See Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, Labor Rights and Trade: Guidance for
the United States in Trade Accord Negotiations (Oct. 30, 2002), http://hrw.org/
press/2002/10/laborrights-bck.htm [hereinafter Labor Rights and Trade].
3. See id.
4. Encyclopedia.com, Trade, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1El-trade.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Trade].
5. See id.
6. Id.; Encyclopedia.com, Free Trade, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1El-free
trad.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Free Trade].
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nineteenth century saw the ascendancy of free trade, with other countries
pursuing the development of open markets. 7 By 1946, twenty-three coun-
tries signed onto the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
promoting free trade throughout the world.8
While the United States entered into limited free trade agreements
during the mid-1900s, it did not enter into a comprehensive free trade
agreement until the late 1980s. In 1987, the United States entered into a
free trade agreement with Canada, eliminating a number of trade restric-
tions.9 But this agreement was superseded by the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect January 1, 1994, be-
tween the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 10 NAFTA provided for
the elimination of duties on half of all goods shipped from the United
States to Mexico and the phasing out of other tariffs over periods of five
to fifteen years. 1
Additionally, in December 1994, thirty-four heads of state from the
Americas, which included North America, South America, Central
America, and the Caribbean Islands, 12 met at the First Summit of the
Americas, agreeing to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) by 2005.13 At the summit, the heads of state agreed "to achieve
substantial progress toward building the FTAA by 2000. ' '14 In April of
1998, formal negotiations for the FTAA were commenced at the Second
Summit of the Americas with the participants agreeing that the "FTAA
Agreement will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will
constitute a single undertaking. '15
As part of the process of achieving an FTAA Agreement, the United
States entered into CAF-A-DR with Costa Rica, the Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua on August 5,
2004.16 CAFTA-DR establishes a free trade area between the United
7. See Trade, supra note 4.
8. Roots of the WTO, A Brief History of GATT, http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/
econ355/choi/wtoroots.htm#History (last visited May 30, 2006).
9. Government of Canada, 1989 - Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement:
Eliminating Barriers to Trade, http://canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/1989
economic.html (last visited May 30, 2006) [hereinafter Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement].
10. Id.
11. Id.; Foreign Agricultural Service (FASonline), The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Policy/NAFTA/nafta.asp (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007) (hereinafter North American Free Trade Agreement).
12. Perry-Castafieda Library Map Collection, Map of the Americas, http://www.lib.
utexas.edu/maps/americas.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
13. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs (ONIA), Free Trade Area of the
Americas, http://www.mac.doc.gov/ftaa2005/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
14. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Antecedents of the FTAA Process, http://www.
ftaa-alca.org/View.e.asp#PREPARATORY (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter
Antecedents of the FTAA Process].
15. Id.
16. Washington Office on Latin America, U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agree-
ment, http://www.wola.org/economic/cafta.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005); Bar-
bara H. Garavaglia, The Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement: Sources of Information, 84 MICH. B.J. 46, 46 (2005).
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States and the six named Central American countries, providing for the
elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade. 17 The legislatures of El
Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Honduras
have all approved CAFTA-DR, and it is pending in Costa Rica. 18 But the
agreement has to be "implemented in at least one of the other signatory
countries" for it to go into effect.' 9
The focus of this comment will be on CAFTA-DR and whether its la-
bor provisions are sufficient to ensure the protection of internationally
recognized labor rights. Additionally, the labor provisions in the most
recent draft of the FTAA Agreement will be examined in comparison to
CAFTA-DR and previous free trade agreements with particular attention
paid to the ramifications of using CAFTA-DR's labor provisions as a blue
print in the FTAA Agreement. Part II of this comment will focus on the
history of free trade agreements within the Americas, including NAFTA,
CAFTA-DR, the anticipated FTAA Agreement, and the connection be-
tween these three agreements. In Part III, the discussion will focus on
CAFTA-DR's labor provisions, comparing its labor provisions with those
of other free trade agreements made by the United States. Part IV exam-
ines the drafted labor provisions of the FrAA explaining why these pro-
visions must be modified before being grafted into the FTAA
Agreement's final draft.
II. HISTORY OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
IN THE AMERICAS
Trade agreements within the Americas began as early as 1854, when
the British, acting on behalf of Canada, and the United States entered
into the Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty, affecting the trade of
raw materials. 20 The United States agreed to eliminate the tariff on natu-
ral resource imports, such as wheat and timber, and Canada agreed to
give the Americans fishing rights off of Canada's east coast. 2 1 The free
trade agreement proved to be a great boon for the Canadian economy. 22
Canada experienced rapid economic growth, with the country's exports
to the United States growing by 33 percent after the treaty took effect. 23
Unfortunately, the exports of the United States increased by only 7 per-
cent, and in 1866, the Americans ended the treaty, believing that Canada
17. Washington Office on Latin America, supra note 16.
18. James T. Berger, CAFTA: A Fast-Track Success Story, AREA DEV. SITE & FACIL-
ITY PLAN., Jan. 1, 2006, at 46, available at 2006 WLNR 47302; Export.gov, U.S.-
CAFTA-DR Free Trade Agreement: How Can U.S, Companies Benefit, http://
www.export.gov/fta/CAFTA/index.asp?dName=CAFrA (last visited May 7, 2007).
19. Garavaglia, supra note 16, at 46.
20. D.C. Masters, Reciprocity, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CANADA 228-230 (W. Stewart
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received the majority of the benefits.2 4
But in January of 1989, Canada and the United States, entered again
into a free trade agreement known as the Canadian-United States Free
Trade Agreement. 25 Though the agreement did remove most remaining
tariffs between the countries, the main focus of the agreement was on
Canada gaining unimpeded access to the United States' economy. 26 But
this agreement was expanded and modified with the implementation of
NAF[A.27
A. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
On January 1, 1994, NAFTA entered into effect.28 NAFTA is consid-
ered a treaty under international law; however, the United States classi-
fies it as a congressional-executive agreement, requiring only a majority
vote in both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. 29 NAFTA
did include two additional agreements addressing environmental and la-
bor issues. 30 Since the labor provisions were not included within the
main body of NAFTA, their effectiveness and weight have been
questioned. 31
NAFTA immediately eliminated duties on half of all goods sent from
the United States to Mexico, and it phased out additional tariffs over five
to fifteen year periods. 3 2 All non-tariff agricultural trade barriers be-
tween the United States and Mexico were removed, and all tariffs dealing
with agricultural trade between the United States and Canada, with some
exceptions, were to be removed by January 1, 1998. 33 Additionally,
NAFTA presented investors with unique guarantees intended to stimu-
late foreign direct investment, 34 encourage relocation of factories and
jobs, and promote deregulation and privatization of basic services, such
as water and energy.35 In promoting the agreement, promises were made
that NAFTA would "create hundreds of thousands of new high-wage
U.S. jobs, raise living standards in the U[nited] S[tates], Mexico, and Ca-
nada, improve environmental conditions and transform Mexico from a
24. Wikipedia.com, Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Canadian-AmericanReciprocityTreaty (last visited May 30, 2006).
25. Vancouver Career College, The History of NAFTA - North American Free Trade
Agreement, http://www.vancol.com/history-of-nafta.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
26. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 9.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Canadian Democratic Movement-Encyclopedia, NAFTA, http://www.canadian
democraticmovement.ca/module-pnEncyclopedia-displayterm-id-16-vid-l.htm
(last visited May 31, 2006).
30. Vancouver Career College, supra note 25.
31. Briefing Paper, Robert E. Scott, The High Price of 'Free' Trade: NAFTA's Failure
to Has Cost the United States Jobs Across the Nation, Econ. Policy Inst., Nov. 17,
2003, at 1, http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers-bp147.
32. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 11.
33. Id.
34. Scott, supra note 31, at 1.
35. Public Citizen, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), http://www.citi-
zen.org/trade/nafta/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
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poor developing country into a booming new market for U.S. exports. '36
Under NAFTA, U.S. domestic exports to Canada and Mexico in-
creased significantly, with real growth being 41 percent to Canada and
95.2 percent to Mexico. 37 These figures appear encouraging, especially in
light of the fact that between 1994 and 2000 total employment rose swiftly
in the United States, resulting in a drop in overall. unemployment. 38 But
the net export between the United States, Mexico, and Canada rose from
$30 billion in 1993, to $80 billion dollars in 2002, which is a 281 percent
increase.39 Further, all fifty states and the District of Columbia suffered a
net loss of jobs because "many more jobs are lost due to growing imports
than are gained by increasing exports. ' 40 Employees working in indus-
tries most affected by trade deficits and capital flight face continued
threats by their employers to close all or part of the company's operations
in the United States and move to another country, usually Mexico.41
In Mexico, fewer workers now hold regular jobs in paying positions
and real wages have plummeted sharply since the implementation of
NAFTA.42 Migration by Mexicans seeking work in the United States has
more than doubled under NAFTA due to the Mexican economy failing to
create enough positions for its workers. 43 The Mexican government ap-
proximated that more than half of the population makes less than the
amount necessary to cover basic needs such as food, housing, and health
care.
44
B. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
U.S. President George H. Bush first expressed the concept of free trade
throughout the American hemisphere in 1990, announcing the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI). 45 The program's goal was to spread
free trade from "'Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego,"' to increase invest-
ment, and to supply "a measure of debt relief" for states in the Caribbean
and Latin America.46 The EAI included negotiating a series of free trade
36. Id.
37. Scott, supra note 31, at 3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 9 10.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Public Citizen, The Ten Year Track Record of the North American Free Trade
Agreement: The Mexican Economy, Agriculture and Environment, in NAFTA AT
TEN SERIES, at 1 (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTA 10
mexico.pdf.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Donald B. Harrington, Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), NATIONAL
WAR COLLECTION MUSEUM ESSAY 92-40 (Jan. 1, 1992), http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA440444&Location=Us&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf [hereinaf-
ter EAJ].
46. Hannah Holm, Enterprise of the America Initiative: An Analysis July '93 (July
1993) (Economic Democracy Information Network Project, Center for Commu-
nity Economic Research, Berkeley University) http://www.nathannewman.org/
EDIN/.trade/.EAI.html.
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agreements, starting with NAFTA, as a means to achieving hemispheric
free trade.47 NAFTA came into force in January of 1994,48 and in De-
cember of 1994, the heads of state from thirty-four countries in the Amer-
icas met to discuss developing a plan for hemispheric free trade.49
In early December 1994, thirty-four heads of state and government of
the Americas came together in Miami, Florida at the First Summit of the
Americas in an effort to construct an agreement through which the econ-
omies of the Americas might be united into a single free trade area.50
They agreed to create the F-IAA "in which barriers to trade and invest-
ment will be progressively eliminated. '51 From the First Summit of the
Americas, the heads of state drafted a Declaration of Principles stating
that "the Americas are united in pursuing prosperity through open mar-
kets, hemispheric integration, and sustainable development. '52 The dec-
laration included discussion on preserving and strengthening democracy
in the Americas, promoting prosperity through free trade, eliminating
poverty and discrimination, and efforts to conserve the environment. 53
Additionally, the declaration states a commitment to conclude negotia-
tions on the FTAA by 2005, with concrete progress toward this goal to be
made before the year 2000.54 Although the FTAA has yet to be finalized,
when it is, it will be the "largest free trade agreement in history, with an
expected combined G[ross] D[omestic] P[roduct] of over $9 trillion, and a
market of some 765 million people. '55
C. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICAN-UNITED STATES
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Negotiations for the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) between the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, and Nicaragua began in January of 2003.56 On December 17, 2003,
the parties completed negotiations for CAFFA.57 Costa Rica, which had
taken part in the negotiations, announced in January of 2004 that it would
join CAFTA, followed by the Dominican Republic in March. 58 The legis-
lation implementing the CAFTA-DR passed in the U.S. House and Sen-
47. Id.
48. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 11.
49. Antecedents of the FTAA Process, supra note 14.
50. Id.





55. Summits of the Americas Information Network, First Summit of the Americas:
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), http://www.summit-americas.org/
Miami%20Summit/FrAA-English(rev).htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter
Summits of the Americas].
56. Adoption of Central American Free Trade Agreement, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 350, 350
(Sean D. Murphy, ed., 2004) [hereinafter Adoption of Central American] (explain-




ate in July 2005, with President George W. Bush signing CAFTA-DR on
August 2, 2005.59
CAFTA-DR was modeled after NAFTA and is generally considered to
be another step towards the realization of a FTAA.60 The overall pur-
pose of CAFTA-DR is to allow free trade between the signatory coun-
tries through the elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers.6' Up
until CAFTA-DR, over 99 percent of exports from Central America
came into the United States duty-free; however, the tariffs placed on U.S.
exports by the six Central American countries ranged from 35 percent in
Honduras up to 60 percent in Nicaragua. 62 Therefore, through the nego-
tiations the United States sought to and did turn this "'one-way-street" of
duty-free access' into a "two-way-street," giving U.S. exporters a level
playing field.63 But the total two-way trade amounts to only thirty-two
billion dollars per year, which is very small compared to America's eleven
trillion dollar economy.64 Further, the World Bank, in a report done at
the request of the United States and the six Central American countries,
warned that CAFTA-DR "'is unlikely to lead to substantial economic de-
velopment,"' 65 which was one of the key selling points for CAFTA-DR
by the Bush administration. 66 The World Bank predicted that the six
Central American countries' economies would grow no greater than 0.8
percent more per year within CAFTA-DR's first five years compared to
the rate of growth without CAFTA-DR in place. 67
Despite the economic and security benefits touted by CAFTA-DR pro-
ponents, CAFTA-DR faced staunch opposition from sugar producers, as
well as environmental, human rights, and labor rights organizations. 68
Sugar and beet producers argue that CAFTA-DR will allow such an over-
whelming amount of sugar into the United States that the sugar industry
59. Garavaglia, supra note 16, at 46.
60. Washington Office on Latin America, supra note 16.
61. Garavaglia, supra note 16, at 46.
62. Foreign Agricultural Service (FASonline), Central American-Dominican Repub-
lic-United States Free Trade Agreement: Overall Agriculture Fact Sheet, www.fas.
usda.gov/info/factsheets/CAFTA/overall021105a.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
63. Id.
64. Warren Vieth, House Oks CAFTA in Narrow Vote, CINCINNATI-KY. POST, July 28,
2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 12264992.
65. Elizabeth Becker, A Push for a Central American Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2005, at C3, available at 2005 WLNR 7553692 [hereinafter A Push for Central
American].
66. See id.
67. Kevin G. Hall & James Kuhnhenn, CAFTA Support, Opposition Are Mottled,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Pa.), July 3, 2005, at E03, available at 2005 WLNR
15741069.
68. See Jim Abrams, Senate Panel Approves CAFTA, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Pa.),
June 30, 2005, at C05, available at 2005 WLNR 15730385; see A Push for Central
American, supra note 65; see Elizabeth Becker, Free Trade Pact in Americas Faces
Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at C1, available at 2005 WLNR 7325749 [here-
inafter Free Trade Pact].
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will be ruined.69 Democrats contend that CAFTA-DR does little to
make the Central American countries enforce existing minimal environ-
mental laws.70 Human rights organizations71 and labor unions oppose
CAFTA-DR primarily due to the weak labor provisions within the agree-
ment, which would allow the Central American countries to continue to
destroy unions and deprive workers of their rights. 72 CAFTA-DR faced
fierce opposition from both Democrats and Republicans who felt that its
labor and environmental provisions were lacking, providing another ave-
nue for the loss of jobs in the United States.73
1. Fast- Track
The speedy passage of CAFTA-DR without modifications to its most
controversial provisions, environmental and labor, is in part due to the
process by which it was passed.74 Shortly before negotiations began on
CAFTA-DR, Congress passed a bill granting trade promotion authority
(fast-track or TPA) to the President. 75 Fast-track is the primary reason
why CAFTA-DR was completed within one calendar year, whereas
NAFTA was negotiated for more than seven years, and the FFAA has
been in negotiations for more than a decade. 76
Fast-track was originally envisioned as a procedural mechanism en-
hancing the "president's credibility in negotiating complex multilateral
trade agreements by streamlining the congressional approval process in
return for enhanced congressional oversight. ' 77 Fast-track derives its
power from the underlying political agreement between Congress and the
President, rising from the 1974 Trade Act.78 In this Act, Congress or-
dered that non-tariff agreements be executed through legislation, and
that the President confer with Congress prior to entering such an agree-
ment.79 In exchange, Congress set up new procedures to guarantee a
timely, amendment-free vote.80 Thus, the President possesses the power
to negotiate trade agreements81 if the requirements of the congressional
69. Jerry Hagstrom, CAFTA Narrowly Passes House: Sugar Farmers Vow to Fight
Pending Bilateral and Regional Trade Deals, GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Aug.
1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 15706195.
70. Edmund L. Andrews, Small Trade Pact Becomes a Big Political Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2005, at C1, available at 2005 WLNR 11754657.
71. See Free Trade Pact, supra note 68.
72. See Eduardo Porter, Group of Democrats Back Pact on Central American Trade,
June 25, 2005, at C2, available at 2005 WLNR 10050310.
73. Vieth, supra note 64.
74. See Berger, supra note 18.
75. Washington Office on Latin America, supra note 15.
76. Id.
77. Policy Brief, Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Brookings Inst., Fast Track Trade Pro -





81. Berger, supra note 18.
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oversight procedure are met.82
Fast-track places limits on Congress as to how much time may be spent
debating trade agreements and it prohibits amendments to the trade
bills.83 This differs from trade agreements not passed under fast-track, in
that Congress may debate on a trade agreement at length and may add
amendments modifying the agreement.84. Every President from 1974 to
1994 had-the power to negotiate a'trade deal "subject to only an up or
down vote by Congress;" 85 however, this power lapsed in 1994 and was
only reinstated in 2003.86 Opponents of fast-track argue that it places
foreign nations at a potentially greater advantage to challenge U.S. labor
and environmental protections.87
The TPA legislation does contain enforceable principal negotiating
objectives to direct the U.S. government as it fashions free trade agree-
ments. 88 The labor objectives Congress outlined in the TPA include: (1)
ensuring that a signatory country to a U.S. trade agreement "'does not
fail to effectively enforce its labor laws,"' (2) acknowledging that trade
agreement parties preserve the right to decide how to allocate resources
to enforce their laws, and (3) strengthening the ability of "trading part-
ners to promote respect for core labor standards." 89 In addition to these
objectives, the TPA directs negotiators to obtain provisions in trade
agreements that "'treat U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally"' in
regards to dispute resolution procedures. 90 These principles and objec-
tives are to be included within the free trade agreements which the
United States negotiates and implements under fast-track.91
2. Passage in Congress & Implementation
CAFTA-DR faced an uphill battle in both the U.S. House and Senate
due to fierce opposition to its labor and environmental provisions by both
Democrats and Republicans. 92 Since CAFTA-DR is not a treaty but an
international agreement, it. only required a majority vote in the House of
Representatives and the Senate.93 The Bush administration sold
CAFFA-DR asnot only a way of opening free trade to Central America,
but also as a way to ensure the United States' security through promotion
82. Brainard & Shapiro, supra note 77.





88. MARY JANE BOLLE, SPECIALIST IN INT'L TRADE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, &
TRADE Div., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DR-CAFTA LABOR RIGHTS ISSUES 6 (Con-
gressional Research Service (CRS) July 8, 2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
(select "Reports" link; then under "Congressional Research Service," select "2005




92. Vieth, supra note 64.
93. Garavaglia, supra note 16, at 46.
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of trade and democracy in the six Central American countries. 94 The
Senate narrowly passed CAFTA-DR on June 30, 2005 with a 54-45 vote
only after the Bush administration satisfied important Democrats with
more Central American labor safeguards.95 According to a Democrat
Senator, there were pledges totaling $160 million over four years to pro-
mote labor laws, which were obviously enough to change the Senator's
vote from undecided to supporting CAF[A-DR.96 On July 28, 2005, 9 7 in
the House of Representatives, CAFTA-DR's approval came down to an
eleventh-hour deal between the Bush administration and U.S. sugar pro-
ducers securing a 217-215 vote approving CAFTA-DR.98 President Bush
signed the legislation implementing CAFTA-DR on August 2, 2005. 99
For CAFTA-DR to go into effect, "the United States and at least one
other signatory state must exchange notifications that their respective na-
tional procedures have been completed to allow compliance with the
agreement, in which case the agreement will enter into force on January
1, 2005, or on another mutually agreed date." 10 0 CAFTA-DR then enters
into effect for the other signatory countries ninety days after the country
provides notification that its national procedures are completed. 10 1 As of
January 1, 2006, the legislatures of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondu-
ras had approved CAFTA-DR, with approval pending in Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. 10 2
III. LABOR PROVISIONS
In order to gain a full understanding of the effects of CAFTA-DR's
labor provisions, not only must an explanation of CAFTA-DR's labor
chapter be provided, but the domestic labor laws of each of the Central
American parties needs to be explored to explain why CAFTA-DR's la-
bor provisions fail to provide a meaningful vehicle for change in the labor
standards of these Central American parties. Moreover, CAFTA-DR's
labor provisions must be examined in light of the free trade agreements
that preceded it, showing where the language used in the agreement
originated and why this language is inadequate for CAFTA-DR.
A. CAFTA-DR's LABOR PROVISIONS
CAFTA-DR's labor provisions are contained within chapter 16 of the
agreement. 10 3 Article 16.1.1 provides that:
94. See A Push for Central American, supra note 65.
95. Id.
96. Abrams, supra note 68.
97. Hagstrom, supra note 69.
98. Berger, supra note 18.
99. Garavaglia, supra note 16, at 46.
100. Adoption of Central American, supra note 56.
101. Id.
102. Berger, supra note 18.
103. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, ch.
16, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, Hein's No. KAV 7157, available at http://www.ustr.
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The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) and their commitments under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and
its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration). Each party shall strive to
ensure that such labor principles and the internationally recognized
labor rights set forth in Article 16.8 are recognized and protected by
its law. 10 4
Article 16.1 indicates that the parties to CAFTA-DR are members of
the ILO and are committed to meeting their obligations under the ILO
Declaration. 10 5 Further, each signatory country is to make every effort to
ensure that the internationally recognized labor principles and rights of
workers are not only established in its law, but are also protected by its
law. 10 6 But this provision imposes no new duty on the signatory countries
because the provision does not require that they meet the international
obligations under the ILO or that the international principles and rights
within the ILO Declaration and article 16.8 be recognized and protected
within their national laws.' 0 7 It simply requires the countries to strive to
ensure that the international rights and principles are acknowledged and
protected by domestic law, without giving any timeline or deadline for
when the countries should have these international rights and principles
within and protected by their domestic legislation.10 8
Further, article 16.1.2 goes on to explain the duty of each signatory
country in regards to its national legislation and internationally recog-
nized labor rights: 10 9
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic la-
bor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws,
each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor stan-
dards consistent with the internationally recognized labor rights set
forth in Article 16.8 and shall strive to improve those standards in
that light. 110
Article 16.8 supplies definitions for the terms used within chapter 16,
and states that labor law for the purposes of chapter 16:
[M]eans a Party's statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that
are directly related to the following internationally recognized labor
rights:
(a) the right of association;
gov (under "Trade Agreements," select "Bilateral" link; then select the agreement;
then under "CAFTA Background," select "Final Text" link).
104. Id. art. 16.1.1 (citation omitted).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, Labor Rights Protections in CAFTA 3
(Oct. 14, 2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/caftal003.htm [hereinafter Labor
Rights Protections].
108. See id.
109. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.1.2.
110. Id.
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(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory
labor;
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohi-
bition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and
(e) acceptable working conditions of work with respect to mini-
mum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.'11
Basically, article 16.1.2 only obligates signatory countries to enforce the
set of labor laws they already have in place.112 As with article 16.1.1,
article 16.1.2 does not compel the signatory countries to have domestic
labor standards consistent with the internationally recognized labor rights
set out in article 16.8, nor does it require the parties to improve upon
those standards. 113 Article 16.1.2 simply requests that the parties strive to
ensure that their domestic laws allow for labor standards in harmony with
the rights within article 16.8, and that the parties try to improve upon
those standards. 114 It is important to note that none of the paragraphs
within article 16.1 require any action on the part of the signatory coun-
tries in regards to their labor laws, and that nothing within article 16.1
prevents the signatory countries from weakening their labor laws so as to
gain an unfair trade advantage. 1 5 Article 16.2.2 does state that the signa-
tory countries "shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or derogate
from . . . such laws [domestic labor laws] in a manner that weakens or
reduces" compliance with rights listed in article 16.8 to encourage trade
or investment within the country. 116 But this article does not demand
that the parties not take such action and allows plenty of room for the
countries to maneuver. 117
Since each country is only obligated to enforce its own labor laws, arti-
cle 16.2 outlines enforcement of labor laws in each of the member
states.118 In article 16.2.1(a), parties to CAFTA-DR "shall not fail to ef-
fectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties".119
Article 16.2.1(b) declares that "a Party is in compliance with subpara-
111. Id. art. 16.8.
112. LABOR ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POL'Y, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP-
RESENTATIVE ON THE U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 10
(Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFfA/
CAF1AReports/asset-upload file63_5935.pdf [hereinafter LABOR ADVISORY
COMM.].
113. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.1.1-.2.
114. See id.; see LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10.
115. See LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10.
116. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,






graph (a)" where the party has pursued a course of action or inaction
based upon reasonable exercise of their discretion or made "a bona fide
decision" about the distribution of resources. 120
In regards to ensuring compliance by the parties with the labor provi-
sions, article 16.6.6 allows parties, where they have failed to resolve a
dispute over compliance with article 16.2.1(a) within sixty days, to request
consultation provided in article 20.4 or a meeting of the commission pro-
vided in article 20.5, and recourse to provisions in chapter 20 (dispute
resolution).1 21 Additionally, a party must first pursue resolution of the
article 16.2.1(a) dispute in accordance with chapter 16 prior to seeking
dispute settlement, and dispute settlement is not available to any party
for any dispute rising from any other chapter 16 provision.122 Therefore,
the only situation in which a party may invoke the dispute settlement
provisions under chapter 20 is when another party fails to enforce its la-
bor laws in a manner affecting trade between the parties, creating an ine-
quality in the procedures and remedies provided for labor disputes within
chapter 16.123 Moreover, in the event a party violates article 16.2.1(a)
and is sanctioned, the maximum fine they will have to pay is capped at
fifteen million dollars, amounting to 3.4 percent of the duties the United
States collected from signatory countries in 2003 and less than 0.065 per-
cent of the total two-way trade with Central America in 2003.124 In addi-
tion, any fine paid by a violating party could potentially end up being
paid back to the violating country to assist them in meeting their obliga-
tions under CAFTA-DR;125 however, there is little oversight provided to
ensure that the violating party uses the money to carry out its obligations
under CAFTA-DR and to ensure that it does not use the money for some
other unrelated governmental purpose. 126
1. International Labor Organization's Labor Standards
Article 16.1 cites the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration), to which par-
ties reaffirm their commitment and promise to strive to ensure that the
principles and rights therein are recognized and protected. 127 This ILO
Declaration, issued in 1998, furthers ILO's overall goal of promoting in-
ternationally recognized labor and human rights through conventions rat-
ified by the countries which are members to the ILO.128 Each of the six
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 16.6.6.
122. Id.
123. See LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 11.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.; see Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 20.16.7.
126. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 12.
127. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.1.
128. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 847-48 (discussing the International Labor
Organization).
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Central American countries party to CAFTA-DR is a member of the
ILO, 129 and thus is obliged to be in compliance with the ILO's
declarations. 130
The ILO Declaration states that all members are obligated "to respect,
to promote and to realize" the principles enumerated within the ILO
Declaration.13 1 The members' obligation consists of implementing na-
tional labor legislation that fully protects the fundamental principles and
rights listed in the ILO Declaration. 132 CAFTA-DR's labor chapter fails
to require that the national labor legislation of the parties uphold the
ILO principles and fully protect the rights of workers. 133 Furthermore,
CAFTA-DR does not even obligate the parties to enforce their existing
labor laws; therefore, even if a country has a law recognizing an interna-
tional labor right, the country may choose not to enforce that law without
consequence under CAFTA-DR.134
2. The Six Central American Countries' Labor Standards
Currently, all of the six Central American countries have labor laws
that fail to meet international standards.135 Abuses of internationally
recognized labor rights in Central America are unending.1 36 Addition-
ally, the Central American governments systematically and flagrantly fail
to enforce their existing labor laws.' 37 The ILO and the U.S. Department
of State have consistently criticized the labor laws of the CAFTA-DR
countries because they fall miserably short of meeting international stan-
dards. 138 Adding to the problem is that countries lack the political will
necessary to bring their labor laws into conformity with international
standards.1 39 Almost every reform in Central America's labor laws dur-
ing the past fifteen years is due to a direct threat to remove trade benefits
under the United States' preference programs. 140
Even United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert B. Zoellick,
at the start of CAFTA-DR negotiations, acknowledged the serious
problems with the Central American countries' labor laws, and Zoellick's
Deputy USTR testified before Congress in 2003, "[W]e need to get those,
129. International Labour Organization, Alphabetical list of ILO Member Countries,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2005).
130. See Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 3.
131. International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, June 19, 1998, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (signed in Geneva at ILO's 86th session).
132. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 3.
133. See id.
134. See Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch, CAFTA's Weak Labor Rights Protec-
tions: Why the Present Accord Should Be Opposed 2-3 (Mar. 10, 2004), http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2004/03/09/usint8099.htm.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 890.
137. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 4.
138. LABOR ADvISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 9.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 10.
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the labor standards and the enforcement of labor rights[,] up to a certain
level before we would find acceptable a commitment to enforce those
laws.' 4 1 Yet none of the CAFTA-DR parties took any action during the
negotiations process to get its labor laws into compliance with interna-
tional standards. 142 Further, the Central American governments have al-
lowed labor law reform proposals to languish in their parliaments for
years without making any progress towards adoption. 143 Therefore, in
order to gain a clearer understanding of the labor laws in effect in the six
signatory countries to CAFTA-DR and the ongoing labor rights viola-
tions, the following sections will examine the laws specifically pertaining
to the rights enumerated in article 16.8 of CAFTA-DR.
a. Costa Rica
In regards to the right of association, 14 4 the law provides that workers
have the right to join unions of their choice without prior governmental
authorization.145 But the ILO has repeatedly encouraged the govern-
ment to bring its laws into complete compliance with internationally rec-
ognized labor rights through the adoption of new measures.' 46 The
Constitution of Costa Rica protects the right of workers to organize.
1 47
Complaints from workers, along with confusion and uncertainty in rulings
by the Costa Rican Constitutional Court, has resulted in the ILO expres-
sing concern regarding the enforcement of this right and expressing hope
that the government will bring its law and practice into harmony with
internationally recognized norms.1 48 Bonded or compulsory labor 14 9 is
prohibited by the Costa Rican Constitution, and laws guarding against
such labor by children are generally enforced.15 0
In regards to a minimum working age for children and the prohibition
and elimination of the worst forms of child labor,151 Costa Rica, in the
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.8.
145. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COSTA RICA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE - 2002 (Mar. 31,
2003), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18326.htm [hereinafter COSTA
RICA: COUNTRY REPORT].
146. Id.
147. Id. (explaining the right to organize within Costa Rican law); CONSTITUCI6N
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA tit. 5, art. 60, available at http://www.
costaricalaw.com/LEGALNET/constitutional law /constitutional-law.php; Do-
minican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra
note 103, art. 16.8 (listing the right to organize as an internationally recognized
labor right).
148. See COSTA RICA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 145.
149. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.8 (listing the prohibition on forced or compulsory labor as
an internationally recognized labor right).
150. COSTA RICA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 145.
151. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.8 (listing the minimum working age for children and the
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Childhood and Adolescent Code, sets the minimum age for employment
of children at fifteen; 152 however, chapter 7 of the Labor Code allows for
children between the age of twelve and fifteen to work less than five
hours daily and no more than thirty hours per week.1 53 Child labor laws
are generally enforced in the formal sector within Costa Rica; but child
labor is an integral part of Costa Rica's informal economy; particularly
agriculture. 154 Costa Rica's Labor Ministry reported in 2002 that there
were 72,000 children between the ages of five and sixteen illegally em-
ployed within the country.155
As to the right of acceptable working conditions, 156 the Constitution
entitles every worker to a minimum wage and a regular working day of
eight hours or forty-eight hours a week, with an overtime provision as
well. 157 During the negotiations of CAFTA-DR, the Costa Rican govern-
ment introduced a proposal to modify its Labor Code so that working
hours would be measured on a year-long calendar, which could allow vio-
lations of international forced labor standards. 1 58 Based upon all of these
violations, Costa Rica fails to comply with article 16.2.1(a) by not effec-
tively enforcing its labor laws protecting the five internationally recog-
nized labor rights defined in CAFTA-DR article 16.8.159
b. The Dominican Republic
The right to organize and the right of association are provided for in
the Dominican Republic's Constitution.160 The Labor Code, as well, pro-
vides for recognition of unions and prohibits firing union members and
prohibition and elimination of the worse forms of child labor as an internationally
recognized labor right).
152. LA GACETA [OFFICIAL JOURNAL] CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENT CODE Ley N'
7739, tit. 2, ch. 7, art. 78 (Costa Rica), available at http://annualreview.law.harvard.
edu/population/children/childrenlaws.htm.
153. CODIGO DE TRABAJO [LABOR CODE], ch. 7, art. 89 (Costa Rica), available at http:/
/www.costaricalaw.com/LEGALNET/laborlaw/labcode-titulo_07.php.
154. COSTA RICA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 145.
155. Id.
156. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.8 (listing acceptable working conditions as an internation-
ally recognized labor right).
157. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA, supra note 147, tit. 5,
arts. 57, 58.
158. Petition from Int'l Labor Rights. Fund & Asociaci6n Servicios de Promoci6n
Laboral to the Chairman of the GSP Subcommittee, Petition to Review Costa
Rica's Country Eligibility Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for
Violation of Internationally Recognized Worker's Rights 3 (Dec. 13, 2004), http://
www.laborrights.org/projects/linklabor/GSP%20Costa %2ORica%2012-04.pdf
[hereinafter Petition to Review Costa Rica].
159. See id.; see Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 103, arts. 16.2.1(a), 16.8; seeCosTA RICA: COUNTRY RE-
PORT, supra note 145.
160. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Do-
MINICAN REPUBLIC: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004
(Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41758.htm [hereinafter
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: COUNTRY REPORT].
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organizers;161 but these laws fall short of the international right of associ-
ation and the right to organize. 162 Additionally, there were widespread
reports of intimidation by employers in the free trade zone areas to
thwart union activity. 163 The Dominican Republic's law does prohibit
any form of forced or compulsory labor; but in 2004, reports were made
that such labor practices occurred. 164 Examples of the forced or compul-
sory labor reported include incidents of workers not being allowed to
leave sugar plantations during harvest 165 and children forced into a form
of indentured servitude. 166
The Dominican Republic in its Labor Code and newly enacted Code
for Minors provides that no one under the age of fourteen may be em-
ployed, with restrictions on the work of children between the ages four-
teen and sixteen.167 Child labor though is a serious problem in the
Dominican Republic, with tens of thousands of children going to work
before reaching the age of fourteen.1 68 In regards to acceptable working
conditions, the Dominican Republic's Constitution and Labor Code pro-
vide that minimum wage levels are to be set by various governmental
entities depending upon the sector of the work. 169 Overall however, the
national minimum wage failed to provide a sufficient amount for living
for workers and their family. °70 Workers on sugar plantations are paid as
little as four dollars a day in tickets, which are redeemable only at planta-
tion-run stores1 71 that charge the workers a service charge reducing their
wages even further.1 72 Enforcement of labor laws within the Dominican
Republic is a severe problem, especially within the free trade zones. 173
Thus, it can be concluded that the Dominican Republic falls short of the
requirements of article 16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR. 174
c. El Salvador
El Salvador's Constitution provides for the right of association; how-
ever, the ILO has consistently found that this right is impermissibly re-
161. Id.
162. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POL'Y, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP-
RESENTATIVE ON THE UNITED STATES-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 5 (Apr.22, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bi-
lateral/CAFTA/DRReports/asset-upload-filel2_3321.pdf [hereinafter REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT].
163. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 162, at 7.





171. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 162, at 7.
172. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 160.
173. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 162, at 6.
174. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.2.1(a).
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stricted by the Labor Code and the El Salvadoran government. 1 75 Both
the Constitution and the Labor Code state that there is a right to organize
and bargain collectively for workers in the private sector and for some
groups within governmental agencies. 176 Nevertheless, the El Salvadoran
government fails to strictly enforce these rights, with numerous com-
plaints and charges against the government as being biased towards labor
and erecting substantial hurdles to the exercise of these rights. 177 El Sal-
vador's Constitution forbids forced or compulsory labor, except in the
event of a natural catastrophe or other cases specified by law.1 78 This
prohibition is usually enforced, but there remain problems throughout
the country with the trafficking of persons.1 7
9
Article 38 of El Salvador's Constitution states that no person fourteen
years of age or younger who is still within the mandatory age for school
may work unless authorized when employment "is indispensable for the
sustenance of themselves or their families". 180 Nonetheless, the number
of children between the ages of five and thirteen working was more than
220,000 according to ILO/IPEC research, with 30,000 children performing
hazardous activities. 181 Though the Ministry of Labor inspectors conduct
inspections, they focus almost completely on the formal sector, where
child workers are rare, and little on the informal sector, where child labor
is the most prevalent. 182 Regarding the right to have acceptable working
conditions, an executive decree sets the minimum wage, the law sets the
maximum number of working hours per week at forty-four, and the con-
stitution requires all employers to ensure that workers' health and safety
is not at risk in the workplace. 183 Workers making minimum wage with
benefits are unable to provide a decent standard of living for their family,
but this assumes that their employer pays them the minimum wage set by
the government; many employers do not.1 84 Additionally, the Ministry of
Labor is ineffective in its attempts to enforce the labor laws, due in part
to the constant problem of corruption among the labor inspectors and
175. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EL
SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004 (Feb. 28,
2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41760.htm [hereinafter EL SALVA-
DOR: COUNTRY REPORT]; Petition from Int'l Labor Rights. Fund & Asociaci6n
Servicios de Promoci6n Laboral to the Chairman of the GSP, Petition to Review
El Salvador's Country Eligibility Under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) for Violation of Internationally Recognized Worker's Rights 3 (Dec. 13,
2004), http://www.laborrights.org/projectslinklabor/GSP%20E%20Salvador%20
12-04.pdf [hereinafter Petition to Review El Salvador].
176. EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 175.
177. See id.; see also Petition to Review El Salvador, supra note 175, at 3.
178. EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 175.
179. Id.
180. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 38, available at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ElSalUElSal83.html.





labor courts.185 Thus, article 16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR is violated by El
Salvador due to a lack of enforcement of the laws protecting the interna-
tionally recognized labor rights set out in CAF-A-DR. 186
d. Guatemala
Both the Guatemalan Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the
freedom of association and the right to join a union, 187 but the feeble and
ineffective attempt of enforcement by the government results in these
rights being very difficult to exercise. 188 The requirements to form a
union are almost insurmountable, and employers are known to retaliate
against workers for forming or participating in unions.189 In addition to
the right of association, workers do have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. 190 Yet intimidation and pressure by employers hinders em-
ployees' efforts to exercise their right to organize' 91 and collectively bar-
gain.1 92  As to the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor,
Guatemala's Constitution provides that "'no person can be submitted to
servitude or any other condition that reduces their dignity.' ' 193 Forced
labor in Guatemala is a problem, and it takes the form of employees
forced to work overtime without the premium pay mandated by the
law. 194
Article 102 of Guatemala's Constitution prohibits employers from hir-
ing children who are fourteen years old or younger in any type of job
unless exempted by law. 195 The Labor Code provides that children four-
teen and younger may be able to work if done through their legal repre-
sentative or within the approval of the General Labor Inspectorate;
however, the work the children do must be adapted to their age, physical
condition, and mental development level. 196 The number of children
under eighteen years of age who work throughout the year has grown
from only 20 percent in 2000 to 23 percent in 2004.197 The ILO estimates
that around 507,000 children between the ages of seven and fourteen
185. Id.
186. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, arts. 16.2.1(a), 16.8.
187. CENTRO PARA AcCION LEGAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS (CALDH) & INT'L LA-
BOR RIGHTS FUND, LABOR RIGHTS AND LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL OB-
STACLES IN GUATEMALA 8 (2004), available at http://www.laborrights.org (select
"ILRF Publications" link).
188. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004 (Feb. 28,





192. CALDH & INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 187, at 15.
193. Id. at 20.
194. GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 188.
195. CALDH & INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 187, at 24.
196. Id.
197. GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 188.
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work, 198 with the top employment sectors being agriculture, fireworks
manufacturers, and mines and quarries. 199 Due to weak labor inspections
and labor courts, the labor laws regarding children fail to be effectively
enforced.20 0
As to acceptable conditions of work, the law sets the minimum wages,
an eight-hour workday, and a forty-eight-hour work week. Additionally,
there are occupational health and safety standards, but they are inade-
quate and rarely enforced. 20 1 The minimum wage fails to provide a suffi-
cient standard of living, with an estimated 57 percent of Guatemalans
living under the poverty line and another 21.5 percent living in extreme
poverty.2 02 Further, employers force employees to work overtime, usu-
ally without pay, and employers are able to do so due to inadequate en-
forcement of the labor laws and inefficiencies in the labor courts. 20 3
Thus, Guatemala's failure to enforce its labor laws contravenes its obliga-
tion under article 16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR.20 4
e. Honduras
Although Honduras' labor laws provide for the right of association, the
laws are not in total compliance with ILO standards due to various re-
strictions placed upon the exercise of this right.20 5 Additionally, Hondu-
ran law grants the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the
Constitution provides the right to strike.20 6 Employers though often re-
fuse to negotiate with unions, and the restrictions upon the right to strike
are strongly criticized by the ILO. 20 7 Both the constitution and the law
forbid forced or compulsory labor, but instances of compulsory overtime
have been reported at maquiladora plants.20 8
The Honduran Constitution and Labor Code prohibit children less
than sixteen years of age from being employed, but fourteen and fifteen
year olds may work with parental consent or authorization of the Minis-
198. Id.
199. CALDH & INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 187, at 23.




204. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, arts. 16.2.1(a), 16.8.
205. Petition from Int'l Labor Rights Fund & Asociaci6n Servicios de Promoci6n
Laboral to the Chairman of the GSP Subcommittee, Petition to Review Honduras'
Country Eligibility Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for Viola-
tion of Internationally Recognized Workers' Rights 3-4 (Dec. 13, 2004), http://
www.laborrights.org/projects/linklabor/GSP%20Honduras %2012-04.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Petition to Review Honduras].
206. B UREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
HONDURAS: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004, (Feb. 28,





try of Labor.209 The ILO reports that 490,000 children in Honduras
work, with 97,000 children between ten and fourteen years of age leaving
school to go to work.210 Further, child labor laws are not enforced effec-
tively outside the maquiladora sector, with violations occurring fre-
quently in rural areas and small businesses. 211 In regards to the right to
acceptable working conditions, Honduran law does provide a minimum
wage and a bonus equaling one month's salary in June and December of
each year; however, the minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living, and the Ministry of Labor lacks the resources to ensure
that the bonuses are actually paid to workers.212 Though the law pro-
vides for an eight-hour work day and forty-four-hour workweek, employ-
ers habitually ignore these laws due to the level of unemployment and
lack of enforcement by the Ministry of Labor.213 In summary, Honduras
violates article 16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR by ineffectively enforcing its la-
bor laws and placing severe restrictions on worker rights.21 4
f. Nicaragua
Nicaragua's Constitution in article 87 recognizes the right of associa-
tion, and article 204 of the Labor Code sets out the rights of trade un-
ions.2 15 While these laws provide for freedom of association, the
government sides with business, lacking the political will to enforce the
laws and allowing the repression of unions.216 As to the right to organize
and bargain collectively, the constitution recognizes both of these rights,
but the Labor Code places severe restrictions on the right to strike, caus-
ing few strikes to be legal. 217 Moreover, employers commonly fire em-
ployees who attempt to form a union, with the Ministry of Labor as a rule
finding that the employer acted within the law. 21 8 The Nicaraguan Con-
stitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, with no major failings in
the law or enforcement of this right being reported. 219
In regards to the prohibition of child labor, article 131 of the Labor
Code provides that the minimum working age is fourteen years old, with
exceptions regulated by the Labor Inspector-General. 220 Further, the La-
209. Id.
210. Petition to Review Honduras, supra note 205, at 3.
211. HONDURAS: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 206.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.; see Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 103, art. 16.2.1(a).
215. INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO
THE ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR LAWS IN NICARAGUA 5, 11 (2004), http://www.labor
rights.org/ (select "ILRF Publications" link).
216. Id.
217. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NIC-
ARAGUA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2004 (Feb. 28,
2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41768.htm [hereinafter Nicaragua:
Country Report].
218. Id.
219. See id.; see INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 215, at 21.
220. INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 215, at 22.
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bor Code prohibits children under eighteen years of age from performing
"unhealthy work or work with moral danger". 221 Nevertheless, child la-
bor is an issue in Nicaragua in both rural and urban areas, and inadequate
enforcement of the laws perpetuates the problem.222
Acceptable working conditions, which include minimum wages, hours
of work, and occupational safety and health,223 are provided for in Nica-
ragua through the Labor Code.22 4 The minimum wage is specifically set
for each employment sector, but in none of the sectors did the minimum
wage meet the $141 amount that the government estimates is needed by
an urban family to buy a basic basket of goods each month. 225 Though
the Labor Code incorporates an eight-hour workday and forty-eight-hour
week, these provisions are consistently ignored. 22 6 Moreover, workers
complain of being forced to do overtime without pay, working in poor
conditions, and of being told when or if they may go to the restroom.227
While Nicaragua appears to comply with the prohibition on forced or
compulsory labor, the government fails to enforce its labor laws and pro-
vide an unbiased system by which workers' complaints may be heard and,
therefore, is not in compliance with article 16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR.228
B. OTHER FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS' LABOR PROVISIONS
CAFTA-DR's labor provisions are an off-shoot of the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), 229 which is the side agree-
ment with NAFTA's labor provisions. 230 NAALC's labor provisions are
a model that the United States uses when linking workers' rights safe-
guards to free trade agreements. 231 A second model the United States
uses is illustrated by the provisions in the free trade agreement between
the United States and Jordan (Jordan FTA), where the labor provisions
are included within the body of the agreement and subject to sanctions
provided in a dispute resolution provision. 23 2 The final model the United
States uses for labor provisions in its free trade agreements is the one
used for CAFTA-DR, as well as, the five preceding free trade agreements
221. Id.
222. NICARAGUA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 217.
223. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 16.8.




228. See id.; see INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, supra note 215, at 21-22; see Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 103,
art. 16.2.1(a).
229. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 876.
230. Id.
231. MARY JANE BOLLE, SPECIALIST IN INT'L TRADE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, &
TRADE Div., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH SINGAPORE
AND CHILE: LABOR ISSUES 6, tbl.3 (Congressional Research Service (CRS) Aug.
13, 2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/22880.pdf [here-
inafter BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS].
232. Id.
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signed.233 This third model, like the Jordan FTA, includes labor provi-
sions in the body of the agreement, but it permits sanctions only when a
country does not enforce its domestic labor laws. 234 The labor provisions
of NAFTA, the Jordan FTA, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile
FFA), and the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Singapore FTA)
will each be discussed for its role in the development of CAFTA-DR's
labor provisions, its effects within the signatory countries, and, thus, any
inferences that can be drawn from the effects that CAFTA-DR may have.
1. NAFTA
The labor provisions for NAF-'A were not included within the main
body of the agreement, but were part of a side agreement, the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).2 35 NAALC re-
quired Canada, Mexico, and the United States to enforce their existing
labor laws, without any additional obligations.2 36 NAALC states in An-
nex 1 that the countries are committed to promote eleven guiding princi-
ples, reflecting the parties' areas of concern in relation to worker's
rights. 237 These guiding principles are similar to the "ILO labor princi-
ples and internationally recognized worker rights" set out within subse-
quent free trade agreements. 238 The listed labor rights in NAALC "do
not establish common minimum standards for [the parties'] domestic
law."'239 Therefore, the principles are simply goals that the parties' com-
mit to promote and are not enforceable standards to which they must
comply. 240 Moreover, a party can only be sanctioned for violating occu-
pational safety and health, child labor, and the minimum wage technical
standard, but freedom of association and the right to organize and to bar-
gain collectively are subject to only cooperative consultation. 241 The
maximum penalty a violating party could face is fifteen million dollars for
the first year, and in the event it does not pay the fine, a suspension of
NAFTA benefits.2 42
Since NAALC is a side agreement, its disciplinary procedures are dif-
ferent and more complicated than those in NAFA, resulting in NAALC
being more of a window dressing than a real enforcement tool of work-
ers' rights.2 43 This lack of enforceability has allowed abuses of workers'
rights to continue in Mexico though the country's labor laws on paper
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 876.
236. Id. at 876-77.
237. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Annex 1, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.
shtml.
238. See Bolle, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.3.
239. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra note 237, annex 1.
240. See id.; see Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 877.
241. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 877.
242. BOLLE, DR-CAFrA, supra note 88, at 3.
243. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 878.
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appear to meet international labor standards. 244
2. United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
The United States and Jordan signed a free trade agreement on Octo-
ber 24, 2000, and included within the body of the agreement an article
specifically addressing labor rights.245 Due to the inclusion of the rights
within the text of the agreement, the Jordan FTA is considered more ef-
fective at enforcing labor rights and a "high-water mark for labor provi-
sions". 246 Moreover, out of the Jordan FTA came the Jordan standard of
including enforceable labor provisions within the main body of free trade
agreements. 247 This Jordan standard is reflected in the Trade Promotion
Act of 2002 as a standard to be met in all free trade agreements. 248
Articles 6.1 through 6.3 of the Jordan FTA read almost exactly like the
labor provisions provided in CAFTA-DR's articles 16.1 and 16.2.249 Arti-
cle 6.3 states that the parties shall strive to ensure that its domestic legis-
lation is consistent with internationally recognized labor rights
enumerated in the agreement. 250 In addition, the Jordan FTA includes
an anti-relaxation clause,251 stating that "each Party shall strive to ensure
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from.., such laws [domestic
labor laws] as an encouragement for trade with the other Party. '252
Though the Jordan ETA's provisions are not the same as the NAALC, it
embraces many of the same ideals.253
The Jordan FTA authorizes sanctions for a violation of any of its labor
provisions, including failure to uphold the ILO labor principles and dero-
gating from domestic labor laws to encourage trade.254 Additionally, the
dispute resolution provisions are the same for both the commercial sec-
tions of the agreement and the labor section,255 allowing a party to "take
any appropriate and commensurate measure" in the event the Joint Com-
244. Id.
245. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 6, Oct. 24,
2000, 41 I.L.M. 63, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilat-
eral/Jordan/asset upload-file250 5112.pdf [hereinafter Jordan Agreement].
246. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 879.
247. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Labor Standards and the Free Trade Area of the Americas 16
(Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003), available at http://www.iie.
com/publications/wp/03-7.pdf.
248. Labor Rights and Trade, supra note 2.
249. Compare Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 6, at 9-10 (setting out the labor
obligations of each party), and Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 103, art. 16.1 (stating almost identical
labor provisions for the signatory countries).
250. Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 6, at 10.
251. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 880.
252. Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 6, at 9.
253. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 879.
254. See BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.3.
255. Alisa DiCaprio, Are Labor Provisions Protectionist?: Evidence from the Nine La-
bor-Augmented U.S. Trade Arrangements, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 13
(2004).
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mittee established in the agreement is not able to resolve the dispute.256
But the ambiguous language used in the dispute resolution provisions
makes it very unlikely that any dispute would reach the point where "'any
appropriate and commensurate measure"' would be taken by one of the
parties. 257
Prior to the signing of the Jordan FTA, Jordan had fairly decent na-
tional labor laws 258 and had ratified twenty-three ILO conventions.25 9
Though the language of the labor provisions is vague allowing room for
manipulation, 260 the labor provisions provided for in the Jordan FTA
were acceptable for Jordan. 261
3. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and the United
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
The Chile FTA and the Singapore FTA were signed within one month
of each other in 2003.262 Unlike the Jordan FTA, these free trade agree-
ments were negotiated and implemented after the passage of the Trade
Promotion Act of 2002 (TPA or fast-track). 263 Therefore, the Chile FTA
and the Singapore FTA, as well as all other free trade agreements negoti-
ated after 2002, are to meet the overall trade negotiating objectives and
principal negotiating objectives expressed within the TPA,264 such as
treating all provisions within trade agreements the same with respect to
dispute settlement availability, procedures, and remedies. 265
In the Chile and Singapore FTAs, the parties agree to strive to ensure
that their domestic laws protect ILO labor principles and internationally
recognized workers' rights. 266 Both of the agreements require the parties
to enforce their existing labor rights legislation even if it does not meet
international standards. 267 The Chile and Singapore FTAs are similar to
NAFTA, and unlike the Jordan FTA, in that they only allow communica-
tion, investigation, and recommendations to settle the majority of the
complaints regarding labor provisions.268 Further, signatory countries
256. Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 17, at 18.
257. Elliott, supra note 247, at 15 (emphasis in original).
258. DiCaprio, supra note 255, at 20.
259. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 879.
260.. See Elliott, supra note 247, at 15.
261. Thea M. Lee, Assistant Dir. for Int'l Econ., Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus.
Org. (AFL-CIO), Comments on the Proposed U.S. - Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) (Nov. 19, 2002), http://www.usleap.org/trade/AFLCIO
CAFTAcommentsl1-02.html.
262. Compare Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, at
24-2, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/
SectionIndex.html, and United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Sing., May 6, 2003, at 236, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/
Singapore FTA/FinalTexts/assetupload-file708_4036.pdf.
263. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 880.
264. Id.
265. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 11.
266. BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.3.
267. Lee, supra note 261.
268. BOLLE, DR-CAFTA, supra note 88, at 3.
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may only be sanctioned for sustained failure to enforce its labor laws in a
way affecting trade, facing a maximum fine of fifteen million dollars an-
nually. 269 This deviates from the Jordan FTA, which authorized sanctions
for all labor provisions, placing them on equal footing with the commer-
cial provisions.2 70 Moreover, if a fine is collected, it is to be used to pro-
mote programs within the violating country to remedy non-enforcement
of its labor laws.2 71 If a party refused to pay the fine, the other party
could collect the fine by reinstating tariffs, on an annual basis, until the
violation is remedied. 272
While on balance the labor provisions in the Chile FTA and the Singa-
pore FTA are acceptable, 273 they violate the TPA by failing to meet the
principal negotiation objective which states that all complaints under the
free trade agreement be treated equally with regards to dispute settle-
ment availability, procedures, and remedies.2 74 Additionally, it is possi-
ble that a party could weaken or eliminate a labor law that it is being
accused of not enforcing, circumventing the dispute settlement provisions
of the free trade agreement. 275 In regards to any fines a party might face,
there is the possibility that it could redirect those funds from programs to
remedy the violation to other unrelated areas of government spending.2 76
Overall, the Chile and Singapore FTAs are barely, if at all, adequate for
those countries, and the agreements do not require compliance with in-
ternational labor rights standards, do not meet the standards required by
the TPA, and do not work as models for other free trade agreements. 277
C. CAFTA-DR's LABOR PROVISIONS IN COMPARISON
CAFFA-DR's labor provisions fail in numerous areas, allowing the
parties to continue inadequate and ineffective enforcement of domestic
labor laws without ever requiring that the parties raise domestic legisla-
tion to meet international labor rights standards.278 These failing are, in
large part, due to the use of the Chile and Singapore FTAs as models for
CAFTA-DR's labor provisions. 279 Both the Chile and Singapore FTAs
are a huge step backwards from the Jordan FTA though they contain
269. Id. at 6 tbl.3 (italics added for emphasis).
270. Id. at 3.
271. Sandra Polaski, Senior Assoc., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Testimony
Before the Senate Committee on Finance on the Implementation of the U.S. Bilat-





274. BOLLE, DR-CAFrA, supra note 88, at 4.
275. Id. at 3.
276. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 2.
277. See, e.g., Polaski, supra note 271, at 2 -3; BOLLE, DR-CAFrA, supra note 88, at 3-4;
Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 2; LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra
note 112, at 9.
278. See Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 890-91.
279. See id. at 889-90.
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some similar provisions, and when combined with the egregious labor
rights violations in the six Central American countries, neither of these
agreements should have been used as a model for CAFFA-DR.2 80
In fact, CAFTA-DR's labor rights provisions are almost identical to the
labor rights provisions in the Chile FTA and are similar to the ones in the
Singapore FTA.28 ' Both of these free trade agreements' provisions and
structure derived from both the NAALC and the Jordan FIA.282 Thus,
CAFTA-DR is similar to the NAALC and the Jordan FTA, and in turn
the Chile and Singapore FTAs, because it only requires countries to en-
force their own labor laws. 283 Similar to the NAALC, CAFTA-DR im-
poses capped monetary fines if disputes over particular labor provisions
are unresolved. 284 CAFTA-DR is like the Jordan FTA, and in turn the
Chile and Singapore FTAs, in that its labor provisions are within the main
text of the agreement.285 In addition, CAFTA-DR is similar to the Jor-
dan FTA in that the parties agree "not to waive or derogate from domes-
tic labor law to encourage trade", but CAFTA-DR, like the Chile and
Singapore FTAs, adds on "encourage trade or investment. '2 86 Different
from the NAALC and the Jordan FFA, but in line with the Chile and
Singapore FTAs, CAFTA-DR provides sanctions only for sustained fail-
ure by a party to enforce its labor laws "in a manner affecting trade."2 87
Understanding that the provisions in the Chile and Singapore FTAs are
on balance acceptable for Chile and Singapore, 288 these provisions are
clearly insufficient for Central America considering the egregious and
systemic failure to enforce existing labor legislation.289 The Chile and
Singapore FTAs are inadequate models for CAFFA-DR because the
Central American parties are developing countries that have a history of
non-enforcement and hostility towards workers' rights; and the laws that
exist are not in harmony with international standards. 290 Further, both
Chile and Singapore have made progress in enforcing their labor laws in
regards to core labor rights;2 91 however, some CAFTA-DR countries
have legislation pending that would actually weaken their labor laws that
already do not meet international labor standards. 292 Moreover, parties
to CAFTA-DR could simply eliminate a domestic law to avoid dispute
280. See id. at 883, 885, 889-91.
281. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 1.




286. BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.3 (emphasis in
original).
287. Id.
288. Polaski, supra note 271, at 2.
289. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 4.
290. See, e.g., BOLLE, DR-CAFrA, supra note 88, at 5; Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 890-
91.
291. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 891.
292. See, e.g., Petition to Review Costa Rica, supra note 158, at 3; Petition to Review El
Salvador, supra note 175, at 6.
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settlement 293 or weaken domestic labor laws to gain an advantage in
trade. 294 In support of this contention is the fact that the Central Ameri-
can parties have weak and irregular patterns of enforcement of domestic
labor laws, combined with a legal system that is ineffectual and corrupt,
providing no effective remedy at all.29 5 The failure contained within
NAALC, the Jordan FTA, the Chile FTA, and the Singapore FTA, re-
quiring countries to enforce their existing domestic laws, continues in
CAFTA-DR, with the potentially devastating consequence of locking in
labor standards that are unacceptable and below ILO standards. 296
CAFTA-DR, like the Chile and Singapore FFAs, is a huge step back-
ward from the Jordan FTA.297 Unlike the Jordan FTA, sanctions in
CAFTA-DR may only be imposed for "sustained failure to enforce one's
own labor laws in a manner affecting trade. '2 9 8 Any claims against a
party under this dispute settlement provision will arguably be difficult to
prove, since the domestic labor law enforcement provision uses the lan-
guage "'strive to ensure.' ' 2 99 In addition, this dispute settlement provi-
sion fails to meet the objectives set out in the TPA providing that all
disputes are to have equivalent dispute settlement procedures and
remedies. 300
Though the NAALC has it failings, it at least provides for a suspension
of benefits up to the amount of the fine assessed against a party when the
party either fails to pay a fine assessed or when a party does not imple-
ment a plan of action to remedy the violation.30 1 Under CAF-FA-DR, if a
violating party does not comply with the action plan issued, then the com-
plaining party may only suspend "benefits of equivalent effect. '30 2
The TPA requires that the U.S. administration (Administration) make
assessments and reports on the labor situation as it truly exists in the
countries with which it is negotiating, allowing the Administration to
modify labor provisions within the final trade agreement so as to make
them meaningful and address the reality of labor rights in each coun-
try. 30 3 Unfortunately, the Administration failed to do this with CAFTA-
DR because the Administration basically cut and pasted provisions from
previous free trade agreements into CAFTA-DR without regard for the
real situation within the Central American countries. 30 4 As stated previ-
ously, numerous times, these Central American countries lacked the po-
293. BOLLE, DR-CAFTA, supra note 88, at 3.
294. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10.
295. Polaski, supra note 271, at 2.
296. See id.; see Lee, supra note 261.
297. See LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10; see Lee, supra note 261.
298. BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 231, at 6 tbl.3 (italics added for
emphasis).
299. See Polaski, supra note 271, at 3.
300. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 11.
301. Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 9.
302. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 103, art. 20.16.2.; see Labor Rights Protections, supra note 107, at 9.
303. Polaski, supra note 271, at 3.
304. See id.
CAFTA-DR LABOR PROVISIONS
litical will to enforce labor laws, resulting in widespread abuse of
workers' rights by private employers, as well as the government; and
these countries have legal systems that, in the majority of cases, only per-
petuate the abuses against workers. 305 Even the Deputy USTR Pete All-
geier acknowledged problems within the Central American countries in
his testimony before Congress:
And so part of our negotiation is not simply negotiating the obliga-
tions, for example, that we have in Singapore and Chile but having a
very detailed and concrete dialogue with these countries about the
kinds of changes that they would need to make in their labor laws,
either in association with this agreement or prior to it ... So we need
to get those, the labor standard and the enforcement of labor rights
up to a certain level before we. would find acceptable a commitment
to enforce those laws.30 6
But modifications were not made to domestic labor laws in the Central
American countries, 30 7 and, in fact, Costa Rica 30 8 and El Salvador intro-
duced laws to weaken 'Workers' rights while negotiating CAFTA-DR.30
9
Furthermore, CAFTA-DR was not negotiated in compliance with the
TPA because labor provisions and dispute settlement procedures from
prior free trade agreements remained unchanged when placed into
CAFTA-DR, failing to address the real obstacles and situations within
the six Central American countries. 310 The Administration failed to capi-
talize on its opportunity to affect change in these six Central American
countries through stronger labor and dispute settlement procedures in
CAFTA-DR, knowing that almost every labor law reform within the past
fifteen years in Central America has been due to a direct threat to re-
move trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP). 311 Furthermore, CAFTA-DR's implementation eliminates the
applicability of the GSP, meaning that only CAFTA-DR's labor provi-
sions, allowing labor laws that fall well below ILO standards, will be
applicable.312
Therefore, CAFTA-DR allows these six Central American countries to
continue along the pathway of sporadic enforcement of labor laws. Thus,
the countries fail to meet international standards and are enabled to cre-
ate new pathways of weakening or reducing existing labor laws and redi-
recting fines assessed against them for violations of CAFTA-DR's labor
provisions into other governmental areas of need. 313
305. See, e.g., LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 9; Labor Rights Protections,
supra note 107; Lee, supra note 261.
306. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 11.
307. See id.
308. See Petition to Review Costa Rica, supra note 158, at 3.
309. See Petition to Review El Salvador, supra note 175, at 6.
310. See, e.g., LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 11; Polaski, supra note 271,
at 3.
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IV. CAFTA-DR'S PRECEDENT FOR THE
FTAA'S LABOR PROVISIONS
The purpose behind the proposed FTAA agreement is that the econo-
mies of the thirty-four countries within the Americas, excluding Cuba,
may be united into a single free trade area.314 If the FTAA is completed,
it will be the largest free trade agreement in history. 315 As of 2004, nego-
tiations were still progressing towards the finalization of the FTAA
though it missed the 2005 deadline for completion. 316
The final draft of the FIAA was done in November of 2003 and is the
source used for comparison with CAFTA-DR.3 17 Chapter VII of the
F[AA contains labor provisions in almost an identical structure and
wording as those within CAFTA-DR. 318 Article 1 of the FTAA repli-
cates CAFTA-DR's Statement of Shared Commitment, stating that the
parties recognize and protect within domestic laws internationally recog-
nized labor rights and shall strive to ensure that domestic laws supply
labor standards in harmony with internationally recognized labor rights
contained within article 7.1.319 The FTAA goes on to recite article 16.2
from CAFTA-DR in article 2, asserting that the parties "shall not fail to
effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course
of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade"; moreover, article 2
repeats that parties acknowledge that it is "inappropriate to encourage
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in
domestic labor laws." 3 20
In regards to the dispute settlement procedures, the FTAA combines
provisions from CAFTA-DR and the Jordan FTA.32 1 The included provi-
sion from CAFTA-DR limits sanctions to article 2.1, requiring parties to
314. Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Third Draft, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.3,
(Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index-e.asp [hereinafter
FTAA Draft Agreement].
315. Summits of the Americas, supra note 55.
316. Id.; Special Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Nuevo Le6n, Jan. 13, 2004,
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits/Monterrey/NLeon e.asp.
317. FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, at ch. I.
318. Compare Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 16.1 (setting out its labor provisions), with FTAA Draft
Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII (restating almost identical labor provisions).
319. Compare Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 16.1 (setting out a statement of shared commitment),
with FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII , art. 1.1 (stating an almost
identical commitment).
320. Compare Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 103, art. 16.2 (stating enforcement of labor laws), with
FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII, art. 2 (replicating the enforce-
ment article within CAFTA-DR).
321. Compare Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 16.4.7 (limiting dispute settlement to art. 16.2.1(a)), with
FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII, art. 8 (repeating same limitation
as CAFTA-DR). Compare Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 17, at 18 (al-
lowing a country to resort to any appropriate measure as recourse in the event of a
failure to comply with a fine), with FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch.
VII, art. 8 (reciting a similar course of action).
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enforce its own labor laws. 322 In addition, the FTAA sets the maximum
fine a violating party may be assessed at fifteen million dollars annually,
which is the same amount within CAFfA-DR. 323 While the Jordan FTA
allows a complaining party to take any appropriate and commensurate
measure needed, the FTAA's provision is similar in that if a violating
party fails to pay the fine assessed or create an escrow account to ensure
payment of the fine, the complaining party "may take other appropriate
steps to collect the assessment," which "may include suspending tariff
benefits under the Agreement as necessary to collect the assessment". 324
But the complaining party is to bear in mind the FTAA's goal to elimi-
nate barriers to bilateral trade while also trying to avert unduly affecting
other parties not involved in the dispute.325
These drafted labor provisions of the FTAA repeat the same errors and
violations as those within CAFTA-DR and the other preceding trade
agreements. 326 First, these labor provisions, like CAFTA-DR, fail to
meet the negotiating standards required by the TPA that the reality of
labor rights within each country be taken into consideration with the final
provisions being drafted accordingly. 327 Not taken into consideration is
the fact that labor law reform in Central America has only occurred due
to the threat of withdrawing trade benefits from the countries if steps
were not taken to meet international labor standards. 328 Not taken into
consideration is the fact that violations of internationally recognized la-
bor rights are especially prominent in Central America 329 and continue in
Mexico in spite of NAFTA. 330 Not taken into consideration is the fact
that on paper most of the countries in the Americas have labor laws,
some of which meet international labor standards but most of which do
not; and these labor laws are, in practice, haphazardly enforced, if they
are enforced at all. 331 Thus, a provision requiring countries to simply
"strive to" enforce domestic labor laws, which are already consistently
ignored and do not meet international labor standards, is really requiring
322. Compare Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 16.2.1 (stating enforcement of labor laws by a party),
with FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII, art. 2.1 (replicating the
enforcement article within CAFTA-DR).
323. Compare Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 103, art. 20.17.2 (giving fifteen million dollars annually as maxi-
mum fine that may be assessed), with FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch.
VII, art. 8.2 (replicating the maximum fine amount from CAFTA-DR).
324. Compare Jordan Agreement, supra note 245, art. 17, at 18 (allowing a country to
resort to any appropriate measure as recourse in the event of a failure to comply
with a fine), with FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII, art. 8 (reciting
a similar course of action).
325. FTAA Draft Agreement, supra note 314, ch. VII, art. 8.6.
326. See, e.g., id.; Lee, supra note 261.
327. See Polaski, supra note 271, at 3.
328. LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10.
329. Pagnattaro, supra note 1, at 890.
330. Id. at 878.
331. See, e.g., id.; LABOR ADVISORY COMM., supra note 112, at 10; Polaski, supra note
271, at 3.
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the countries to enforce the faulty set of labor laws which they already
have.332 If the Administration fails to tailor the labor provisions accord-
ing to the reality of labor rights within the countries of the Americas, it
will allow, if not encourage, violations of internationally recognized labor
rights to continue. 333
Furthermore, the FTAA, like CAFTA-DR, is a step backwards from
the Jordan FTA in regards to the dispute resolution procedures. 334 Prov-
ing that a country has failed to enforce its national labor laws will be
extremely difficult because it has to be shown that the violation was due
to "a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction. ' 335 Addition-
ally, the fact that the dispute resolution procedures are limited solely to
the provision regarding labor law enforcement violates the TPA by treat-
ing the remaining labor provisions unequally and fails to make enforcea-
ble the provision regarding a shared commitment to internationally
recognized labor rights.336 Moreover, the fifteen million dollar fine as-
sessed annually in the event of a violation in CAFTA-DR provided little
deterrence, representing only 0.065 percent of the total two-way trade
with Central America in 2003, and will provide almost no deterrence, if
any at all, in the F-TAA considering the immense amount of trade that
will be conducted between the parties.337 The FTAA does provide that a
complaining party may take "other appropriate steps" in the event the
fine is not paid, but included is an admonition not to forget the objective
of the FTAA to eliminate trade barriers and to not unduly affect another
party or its interest not involved in the dispute. 3 3 8 This additional lan-
guage appears to warn a complaining party that steps taken which harm
either the FTAA objective or another party may lead to the complaining
party being subject to claims against it as well.339
In conclusion, the FTAA is an opportunity for the United States to
place labor provisions requiring compliance with international labor stan-
dards and providing enforceable protections for internationally recog-
nized labor rights within the largest free trade agreement in history.340
As it stands now, the FTAA falls hopelessly short of this position, lead-
ing, at the very least, to continued non-enforcement of labor laws that do
not meet international standards, and at worst, to the weakening or elimi-
nation of labor laws that are involved in disputes under the FTAA. 341
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V. CONCLUSION
CAFTA-DR was presented as a vehicle to advance U.S. commercial
interests, as well as, spread stability and security within the Americas.
3 42
Realizing that the economic impact is relatively small, President Bush
pushed the agreement as "a commitment of freedom-loving nations to
advance peace and prosperity throughout the Western Hemisphere.
343
But CAFTA-DR does not advance peace or prosperity in the six Central
American countries that are parties to it because CAFTA-DR does not
act as an avenue for advancing workers' rights and requiring compliance
with international labor standards. 34
4
CAFIFA-DR fails to address the continuous, egregious manner in
which workers' rights are violated in the six Central American parties. It
also fails to provide any meaningful mechanism of enforcement for the
labor rights that it claims to recognize and uphold.345 The Central Amer-
ican parties to CAFTA-DR lack the political will to enforce the substan-
dard labor laws they have, much less the political will to push for labor
laws meeting the exacting standards of the international community. 346
Change in Central American labor laws has only come about as a result
of international pressure, and the United States failed to capitalize on its
opportunity to place pressure on these six countries to change with
CAFTA-DR's labor provisions. 3
47
In conclusion, CAFTA-DR's labor provisions fall incredibly short of
meeting the obligations within the TPA and those set out by the ILO and
international community. 348 Therefore, the United States should not fail
to recognize the opportunity it has with the FTAA to correct the unfortu-
nate errors made in CAFFA-DR's labor provisions. In capitalizing on
this opportunity, the United States should make sure that the FTAA pro-
vides enforceable labor provisions requiring compliance with internation-
ally recognized labor rights and standards, stopping a race to the bottom
by governments and employers, and adhering to the domestic and inter-
national obligations which obligate the United States to uphold and pro-
tect international labor rights.
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